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WORKER'S COMPENSATION THIRD PARTY SUITS:
THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYER NEGLIGENCE
ON THIRD PARTY RIGHTS
Susie Morgan*
When the negligence of two or more parties combines to cause
injury, the wrongdoers are "joint tort-feasors," and each is jointly
and severally liable to a plaintiff for the whole amount of his
damages.' Historically, when only one of the negligent parties was
obliged to satisfy the entire judgment, he was not entitled to
recover any part of the loss from his fellow tort-feasors.2 In response
to heavy criticism of this common law rule, courts and legislatures
have begun to recognize the principle of contribution, whereby tort-
feasors are required to share the liability created by their combined
negligence.3 The purpose of allowing contribution is to prevent the
unjust enrichment of the tort-feasor who, by chance or by design of
the plaintiff, is not called on to satisfy the judgment.' Additionally,
principles of indemnity may be brought into operation to shift the
entire liability from the tort-feasor against whom there has been a
recovery to another who should pay instead.' Although the right to
indemnity usually depends on an express contractual obligation, in-
demnification also frequently exists in favor of those whose liability
is only technical, i.e., either based on a no-fault principle or arising
under circumstances in which the conduct of another is more
blameworthy.' The principles under which indemnity may be
secured are not well-settled at this time.7
Before either contribution or indemnity is allowed, one require-
ment is certain: there must be a legally enforceable liability on the
part of each tort-feasor toward the injured person; the defendant
must have been obliged to satisfy an obligation for which the other
*J.D. 1980, Louisiana State University Law Center. The author wishes to express
her gratitude to Boyd Professor Emeritus Wex S. Malone whose guidance, inspiration,
and patience made this work possible.
1. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 692 (1956).
2. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 305 (4th ed. 1971).
3. Comment, Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensa-
tion Acts, 42 VA. L. REV. 959, 960 (1956).
4. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 307.
5. Id. at 310.
6. Id. at 310-12.
7. Id. at 313.
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tort-feasor could have been held liable For this reason, contribution
and indemnity become more complex when one of the tort-feasors
has personal immunity negating the possibility of tort liability on
his part. There are a number of different settings in which this
might occur For example, an employee may be injured by the con-
current negligence of his employer and a third party completely
foreign to the business concern." The employer and employee are
parties to the statutorily mandated workers' compensation scheme.
This system grants the employer tort immunity in return for his
obligation to pay compensation for all work-related injuries, whether
or not he is at fault. Although the employee is allowed only a com-
pensation claim against his employer, the employee is free to pursue
a negligence action against others who harm him. When both the
employer and a third party have negligently caused the employee's
injury, two valid claims are in conflict. The employer asserts his im-
munity from tort liability, which, he insists, should not be impaired
by an obligation to reimburse the third party. Conversely, the third
party has a right to contribution or indemnity from his co-tort-
8. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 1, at 718.
9. Individual immunity from tort liability is granted in Louisiana in several dif-
ferent settings. In two situations non-liability is based on the personal relationship bet-
ween the injured party and the tort-feasor. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1960) was modified in
the recent comprehensive revision of Louisiana matrimonial regimes law to authorize
certain suits between husband and wife. See 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 4. But claims by
one spouse against another for his or her personal negligence are still prohibited. A
parent in Louisiana may not be sued in tort by his minor unemancipated child by vir-
tue of LA. R.S. 9:571 (Supp. 1960). However, both of these statutes have been inter-
preted by the Louisiana Supreme Court as merely procedural bars to the right to sue
which do not destroy the substantive cause of action arising as the result of the tort.
Thus, the spouse or parent whose negligence combines with that of a third party to
cause the injury remains a joint tort-feasor liable for contribution. Walker v. Milton,
263 La. 555, 268 So. 2d 654 (1972) (parent whose negligence contributed to child's in-
jury liable for contribution); Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695,
174 So. 2d 122 (1965) (defendant accorded right to contribution from plaintiff's
husband). Additionally, the state and its political subdivisions traditionally were im-
mune to suits for personal injury or property damage. Sovereign immunity was
abrogated by the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10. A good discus-
sion of individual defenses in relation to contribution may be found in Larson, A Pro-
blem in Contribution" The Tortfeasor with an Individual Defense Against the Injured
Party, 1940 WIs. L. REV. 467.
10. This distinction between the procedural bar to suit and the substantive cause
of action recognized in Louisiana in the husband-wife and parent-child settings, see
note 9, supra, is not similarly valid in workers' compensation cases. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has denied the third party the right to contribution from the concur-
rently negligent employer. The employer's liability to the employee for compensation
benefits is considered absolute and not based on fault. Therefore, the employer is not a
joint tort-feasor and is not liable for contribution or indemnity. LeJeune v. Highlands
Ins. Co., 287 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 290 So. 2d 903 (La. 1974).
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feasor, which right, he believes, should not be withdrawn because of
the sheer fortuity that the injured party is an employee entitled to
receive compensation benefits. Historically, the employer's interest
has prevailed over that of the third party." Even in cases in which
contribution or indemnity would be allowed under accepted fault
principles, courts generally place primary emphasis on preserving
the tort immunity of the employer and, to accomplish this goal, deny
the third party his right to contribution.'2
The situation is further complicated by the fact the employer en-
joys an additional right. In most states, when the employee is suc-
cessful in his personal injury action, the employer is entitled by
statute to be reimbursed for all of the compensation benefits he has
paid. This is usually accomplished by statutorily granting the
employer a lien against the proceeds of the employee's tort
recovery.13 Traditionally this right is granted to employers even
when their fault contributes to the employee's accident.' The result
is that the employer is allowed to shift the entire loss outside of the
employment industry, even though the injury was caused at least in
part by wrongful acts or omissions originating within the business.
The unqualified reimbursement of the employer raises the question
of whether, despite the -belief that the compensation principle
justifies providing even the negligent employer with freedom from
direct tort liability to his employees and with immunity to claims for
contribution or indemnity, the law should also secure for the
employer repayment of the compensation benefits he has paid.
Perhaps a preferable solution would be to leave this loss with the
employer by denying reimbursement when his negligence con-
tributes to the employee's injury. The benefit of such a refusal
would have to be allocated to one of two people, the third party or
the injured employee. If denying reimbursement were coupled with
a reduction of the third party's tort liability, the advantage given
the third party could serve as a compromise between his rights and
11. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.10 (1976).
12. Id.
13. Id. at § 71.20.
14. See, e.g., Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 68 S.E.2d 384
(1951); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Cedar Valley Elec. Co., 187 Iowa 1014, 174 N.W. 709
(1919). However, the present rule in Louisiana is that the employer or his insurer is en-
titled to reimbursement only when the employer is not chargeable with any personal
negligence. See 1 W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 371 in 14 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 193 (2d ed. 1980). The Third Circuit
Court of Appeal indicated in Highlands Insurance Co. v. L. J. Denny & Son, 328 So. 2d
779 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), that the employer's negligence, whether personal or im-
puted, would not bar his recovery; however, the statement is dicta, since the
employer's personal negligence was not proved in the case.
1980]
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those of the employer. The third party would be relieved of the
obligation of repaying to the employer the compensation benefits
paid before judgment and, concomitantly, the third party's tort
liability would be reduced by that amount. On the other hand, the
windfall might inure more properly to the injured employee; the
worker would then be entitled to retain both his tort damages and
compensation with no obligation to repay his employer.
It has been suggested that certain advantages would accure if
the alternative favoring the employee were adopted.", The third par-
ty would be liable for the full amount of the employee's damages,
while the employer would be denied reimbursement of the compen-
sation he has paid. The employee who receives both workers' com-
pensation and tort damages for his injury gets a double recovery.
Arguably, this might be justified on the grounds that compensation
benefits are similar to insurance proceeds. In ordinary negligence
actions the collateral benefits rule entitles the victim to retain his
private insurance proceeds without suffering a diminution of tort
recovery. The receipt of compensation benefits might also be viewed
as a fortuity not affecting the amount of damages due from a tort-
feasor. Furthermore, the mandatory compensation scheme may be
regarded as a means of providing insurance protection against
disability or death for wage-earners who would not otherwise be
able to afford insurance. The employee's compensation benefits are
more analogous to insurance coverage than to tort damages;
therefore, recovery of compensation benefits should have no effect
on a negligent third party's liability. 6 However, this approach con-
sistently has been rejected by the courts, because a double recovery
is considered undesirable. 7 Nevertheless, the employee has not been
mistreated. In all cases his common law rights against negligent
third parties remain unimpaired, and the employee in effect receives
the full amount of his tort judgment.
The court's aversion to allowing a negligent employer to escape
all responsibility is most likely to inure to the benefit of the third
party by relieving him of the obligation of reimbursement. The judg-
ment against the third party then can be reduced by the amount of
compensation paid, without diminishing the employee's rights. The
15. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term- Workmen's Compensation, 34 LA. L. REV. 354, 362 (1974).
16. Id. at 363. But cf. A. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 71.30 (workmen's compensa-
tion not the equivalent of accident insurance).
17. A. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 71.20. However, California courts do allow a
partial double recovery in the context of an employer's claim that the employee's tort
recovery should be credited against any compensation liability which remains after the
third party suit. See notes 57-138, infra, and accompanying text.
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employee will receive this reduced recovery free and clear of any
claims or liens by the employer. Thus, the employee's total recovery
will amount to full tort damages, but with only part coming from the
third party and the rest provided by the employer.
Although this approach divides the loss between the two
negligent parties, it is not technically contribution from the
employer. The right to contribution exists only when one tort-feasor
discharges the entire claim by paying more than his share, unjustly
enriching the other negligent parties. The party who has paid is
then entitled to proceed against the other equally liable parties
through a third party action or a spearate suit, depending on the
procedural rules of the jurisdiction."8 The compensation situation dif-
fers in several respects. The employer's reimbursement is not
denied in order to prevent his unjust enrichment at the expense of
the third party; rather, disallowing reimbursement to the employer
assures that he is penalized appropriately for his wrongdoing. When
the negligent employer is denied reimbursement, the reduction of
the tort judgment has the effect of preventing a double recovery by
the employee, rather than of accommodating a third party's right to
contribution. Admittedly, the net effect is that both tort-feasors pay
part of the tort damages, the same result achieved by contribution
rules. However, the fact that the third party has not paid the full
amount and then proceeded against the employer to recover his
share and the absence of tort liability on the part of the employer
negate a conclusion that conventional contribution occurs. Consider-
ing these discrepancies, analysis of this problem by comparison to
principles of indemnity and contribution among joint tort-feasors
may seem anomalous, but both theories of recovery share similar
rationales and repercussions. Both principles are designed to pre-
vent negligent parties from enjoying undeserved relief from liability.
Likewise, both remove part of the burden from a party who could
have been forced to pay the entire amount of the damages. These
similarities and the recent trend toward holding the employer liable
for his full share of the loss give validity to the comparison between
workers' compensation third party suits and the tort principles of
contribution and indemnity.
The growing social concern for more equitable distribution of
loss-bearing has affected the workers' compensation scheme in
several ways. The modern preference for comparative negligence
and its concomitant, comparative contribution, has called into ques-
tion the practice of denying the employer all reimbursement when
he has been found slightly negligent. Comparative negligence is
18. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, Comments f & i (1979).
1980]
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hard to apply in ordinary negligence actions and raises even more
challenging questions in compensation actions, in which the denial of
reimbursement is the rule. For example, the compensation benefits
paid may actually exceed the employer's true percentage share of
the tort damages. If the employer is denied reimbursement com-
pletely, he will be forced to bear a heavier burden than would the
ordinary tort-feasor. On the other hand, if the employer has paid
less compensation than his proportional share of the damages, it
seems unfair to expect the third party to make up the difference. In
either event, it is difficult to determine whether the negligent
employer should be reimbursed nothing, should receive the full
amount he has expended, or should be repaid on a percentage basis.
Only one state supreme court has faced squarely the intricate in-
teraction of the tort and compensation systems and has attempted
to reconcile the policies underlying both. 9
Some recent decisions have resolved the conflict between the
rights of the negligent employer and of the negligent third party by
subjecting the employer to full liability for contribution or indemnity.
This approach strikes at what traditionally has been considered an
indispensable element of workers' compensation law-the
employer's freedom from tort liability for injuries to his employees.
The employer's freedom from direct negligence claims by his
employees is embodied in each jurisdiction's statutes and remains in-
violate. This immunity universally is regarded as essential to sus-
tain the basic compromise of the compensation principle."0 Even in
jurisdictions where the careless employer is denied reimbursement,
his tort immunity remains intact if he is never forced to pay more
than compensation. However, the scope of the employer's protection
from claims other than direct claims by employees is currently in
question. The idea that an employer's personal immunity must also
preclude third party claims for contribution or indemnity is no
longer unquestionably accepted as necessary to the integrity of the
compensation system. In fact, a new approach which forces the
employer to pay his full share of the tort damages has already gained
recognition in at least two states.2 ' In these jurisdictions, the third
party who is sued for the entire amount of the employee's damages
may obtain contribution or indemnity from the concurrently negligent
employer in accordance with the general principles of tort law. The
employer's duty to the third party is measured by the extent to
19. See Associated Constr. & Eng'r Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.,
22 Cal. 3d 829, 587 P.2d 684, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1978).
20. A. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 65.10.
21. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Il1. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437
(1977); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
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which the employer's actions contributed to the employee's injury.
The customary insulation of the employer from all tort liability,
whether direct or indirect, makes this approach both novel and
radical.
When the employer is required to contribute or indemnify like
any other tort-feasor, his right to be reimbursed or to receive a
credit for the compensation he has paid must be determined. If the
employer is denied reimbursement, the employee will receive a dou-
ble recovery, and the employer will bear a double burden. Any re-
quest for such a rule is probably doomed to failure by judicial reluc-
tance to award the employee both compensation and full tort
damages and by the obvious unfairness of requiring the employer
to pay both compensation and tort damages. Instead, the employer
would probably be allowed reimbursement or a credit of the amount
of the compensation paid and would actually pay only his portion of
the tort judgment.
No matter how the conflict is resolved, an additional complica-
tion may develop after the third party has paid his share of the
judgment. At this point, the employee often has received only tem-
porary disability benefits from his employer and thus remains entitled
to a determination of the full extent of his disability and of the re-
maining amount of compensation due him. The non-negligent
employer generally is allowed a credit in the tort recovery against
his remaining compensation liability; the blameworthy employer's
right to this same benefit is not so clear. In states where the
negligent employer is reimbursed regardless of his fault, he should
likewise be entitled to the credit; but if the employer is in a jurisdic-
tion where reimbursement is denied as a penalty for carelessness, it
seems inconsistent to allow the set-off to reduce his liability.
Arguably, the credit is proper even in states where reimbursement
would be denied, since the third party has already discharged his
obligation, and denying the credit cannot retroactively reduce the
amount of the judgment against him. However, the denial of reim-
bursement generally is seen as punishment of the employer, rather
than as amelioration of the third party's condition. Therefore, the
lack of a benefit to the third party as a result of the denial of the
credit is irrelevant, except insofar as the employee may get double
recovery, a possibility rejected in the reimbursement context.2
Recent trends on employer liability may extinguish the
employee's right to receive further compensation benefits after com-
pletion of the tort suit against the third party. When the negligent
employer is required to contribute or indemnify, whether he should
22. See note 17, supra.
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bear additional compensation liability is questionable, since the
employee receives full tort damages. The employer probably should
not incur additional liability, as there is no justification for granting
the employee the right to recover more than his full tort damages,
an amount sufficient to cover all elements of his loss. If the
employee is entitled to proceed, whether the employer should
receive a credit against his remaining liability, despite his
negligence, and, if so, whether the credit should reflect the compen-
sation paid prior to the third party suit or the employer's contribu-
tion to the tort judgment, remain problematical. Furthermore, the
application of comparative negligence principles to the third party
suit may affect the employer's right to a credit against his future
responsibilities to the injured employee. Solving this dilemma re-
quires balancing the court's distate for rewarding a negligent
employer against the policy favoring limitation of the employee's
recovery to full tort damages. Ultimately, the issue must be resolved
in the context of the negligent employer's rights in each jurisdiction.
For the most part, the difficult process of resolving these con-
flicts and inequities has been sidestepped by a blanket preservation
of the employer's tort immunity against claims by employees or by
third parties. However, innovative and improved, if not completely
satisfactory, answers have been posited; three unorthodox ap-
proaches define more fully the problems which arise when the
employer and the third party are joint tort-feasors and present
novel solutions.
NORTH CAROLINA
Nearly fifty years ago, North Carolina became the first state to
attempt to resolve the conflict between the interests of the
employer and the third party; the North Carolina Supreme Court
formulated a rule, later clarified and embodied in statutes"3 and still
regarded as liberal. In an unprecedented decision, the court adopted
a compromise approach denying reimbursement to the negligent
employer for the compensation benefits he has paid and reducing
the third party's tort liability by the amount of compensation due
the plaintiff." Even today North Carolina's position is the extreme
minority view, as the great majority of jurisdictions allow the
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1929).
24. The holding was first announced in Brown v. Southern Ry. Co., 204 N.C. 668,
169 S.E. 419 (1933), but the decision is made confusing by technical rules requiring the
employee to choose between collecting compensation and pursuing his third party ac-
tion. The abrogation of the "election doctrine" in 1933 makes much of the discussion in
this case obsolete and needlessly confusing.
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negligent employer to seek reimbursement.2" The 1950 decision
enunciating the compromise approach was Essick v. City of Lex-
ington;26 in Essick, an employee who had received compensation
from his concurrently negligent employer sought full tort damages
from a third party. The court, relying on the exclusive remedy pro-
vision of the state's workmen's compensation act, refused the third
party's request to join the employer as a defendant for purposes of
contribution.27 The third party was granted extraordinary relief,
however, since the court upheld his right to plead the employer's
contributory negligence as a defense by reducing the damages
award by the amount that would have been applied toward reim-
bursement.28 This partial defense, entitling the third party to a pro
tanto reduction in his liability, is also effective when a co-worker,
rather than the employer himself, is negligent. 9 The employer's
direct wrongdoing or his vicarious responsibility for the acts of his
employees bars only his right to repayment, and the injured
employee remains entitled to proceed against the third party to
recover the tort damages which exceed the amount of compensation
paid. Thus, the employee recovers full tort damages, part from his
employer by way of compensation payments and the remainder from
the negligent third party.
If, for example, the compensation liability of the employer is
$5,000 and the total tort damages equal $15,000 and both the
employer and the third party negligently contributed to the injury,'
the employer owes $5,000 in compensation benefits. But he is denied
reimbursement out of the tort recovery because of negligence at-
tributable to his enterprise. The third party's tort liability of
$15,000 (representing full damages for the employee's injury) is
reduced by the amount of compensation paid to $10,000. The
employee receives $15,000, an amount sufficient to cover all ex-
penses of his injury.
North Carolina's is the minority position, but there have been
other progressive approaches to the third party suit. For example,
Pennsylvania also denies reimbursement to the negligent employer
25. A. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 75.23.
26. 232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950).
27. 232 N.C. at 209, 60 S.E.2d at 112.
28. 232 N.C. at 211, 60 S.E.2d at 114.
29. Poindexter v. Johnson Motor Lines Inc., 235 N.C. 286, 287, 69 S.E.2d 495, 496
(1952). See note 42, infra (the Louisiana rule).
30. The percentages of fault contributed by the employer and the third party are
irrelevant under this scheme, since the amount deducted from the third party's liabil-
ity is always the amount of compensation due the employee, regardless of the
employer's degree of responsibility for the harm.
1980]
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and reduces the third party's liability pro tanto 1 However, the
Pennsylvania rule is not based on the "partial defense" rationale. In-
stead, in Maio v. Fahs,32 a case decided only seven years after North
Carolina framed its rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court worded
its holding in terms of the employer's duty to contribute.3 In Maio
the third party was allowed to join the employer as a co-defendant.3
The employer argued that he was liable to his employees solely for
compensation under the exclusive remedy provision of the workmen's
compensation act and that he was not a joint tort-feasor subject to
joinder as a defendant or to liability for contribution. The court held
that the employer was liable for contribution, but limited his share
to the amount of benefits due to the employee under the compensa-
tion act. Because the employer's obligation was thus limited, it was
not true contribution, and confusion would have been avoided had
the Maio holding been couched in other terms. But, regardless of
terminology, the result is the same as that reached in North
Carolina.
At one time California embraced the North Carolina position,
but has recently modified its approach. In 1961 the California
Supreme Court held in Witt v. Jackson" that the employer could not
recover the compensation he had paid if his own carelessness or that
of one of his employees contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. To
avoid a double recovery, the court reduced the injured employee's
recovery of tort damages from the negligent third party by the
amount of compensation received. Although the California Supreme
Court relied heavily on the North Carolina scheme in reaching its
decision, the holding is not based on the partial defense rationale.
Instead, the court attached an additional substantive requirement,
freedom from fault, to the employer's reimbursement rights. The
adoption of comparative negligence in California" has altered
substantially that state's resolution of this issue.
31. See Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 190, 14 A.2d 105, 109 (1940).
32. 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).
33. 339 Pa. at 192, 14 A.2d at 111. This principle has been applied once in Loui-
siana at the appellate level. In Moak v. Link-Belt Co., 229 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969), the court granted the negligent employer reimbursement of the compensation he
had paid, but then held him liable for "partial contribution or quasi-contribution" in
this same amount-up to a limit of one-half of the tort damages awarded because of
the pro rata contribution rule in effect in Louisiana at that time. The Moak case was
considered by the Louisiana Supreme Court, but by that time the claim which raised
the issue had been dismissed on motion of the parties, and the supreme court did not
reach the question. Moak v. Link-Belt Co., 257 La. 281, 242 So. 2d 515 (1970).
34. 339 Pa. at 187, 14 A.2d at 109.
35. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).




The basic elements of the North Carolina method are simple, but
there are several areas in which complications may develop. For ex-
ample, one difficulty arises from the fact that the employee often
receives only temporary disability payments before the third party
suit and does not proceed against the employer for the bulk of his
benefits until later. The question presented is whether the third
party's tort liability should be reduced by the amount of compensa-
tion which has actually been paid prior to the judgment or by the
total quantity which is due the employee. If only those payments
prior to the judgment are deducted and the employer is allowed to
credit the remaining amount of the tort recovery against his future
liability, the credit seems inappropriate, particularly in light of the
court's earlier denial of reimbursement because of fault. But, if the
set-off is denied, to the extent that compensation payments are
made after the third party suit, the employee's recovery will exceed
full tort damages. The North Carolina court wisely avoided these
logical inconsistencies by providing that the judgment against the
third party is to be reduced by the amount of compensation which
has been paid or is payable to the employee. 7 The total compensa-
tion is determined on the basis of a stipulation between the in-
terested parties or after evidence on the issue is submitted to the
court. Thus, under the North Carolina scheme, the negligent
employer clearly has no right to a credit against his future compen-
sation liability, because the employee's tort recovery has already
been adjusted.
The likelihood that some employees will settle their third party
claims is also a potential source of confusion. The North Carolina
statute requires the consent of both the employer and the employee
if release of a third party is to be enforceable against both.38 One ex-
ception to this rule exists when the employee and the third party
execute the agreement and provide for full reimbursement of the
employer from the proceeds. 9 In this situation there is no need to
require the employer's consent, because he has been granted com-
plete relief by the terms of the contract, and his approval should be
presumed. If the employer consents to a release which does not
grant reimbursement rights, he is denied reimbursement and loses
his right to sue the third party separately; conversely, an employer
is not bound by a compromise agreement prejudicing his rights if he
does not sign it. Under the North Carolina Act, when the employer
withholds his consent, he retains the. right to file his own suit
37. See Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 669, 73 S.E.2d 886, 891 (1953).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(h) (1929).
39. Id.
19801
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against the third party to recover his compensation expenditure.
Presumably, the third party also will retain the right to assert the
employer's contributory negligence as a defense to the reimburse-
ment claim. No cases or statutes directly address the point, but this
approach accords the employer and the third party the same rights
they would have if the employee were a party to the suit. The third
party pays tort damages in excess of compensation due. The third
party and the negligent employer then either litigate the issue of
employer-fault or reach a compromise based on the employer's
chances of success if he brings a lawsuit for reimbursement.
There are simple reasons to shield the employer from tort
claims but to deny him reimbursement. Because the employer
assumes the responsibility to pay compensation to all injured
employees, it would be unfair to subject him to direct tort liability
to his employees, even when he is personally negligent. But his fault
need not be ignored when he steps out of the compensation system
to seek reimbursement from a third party tort-feasor. To deny reim-
bursement to a negligent employer is not an unduly harsh penalty.
As one North Carolina judge observed, when the employer seeks to
recover from the third party, "his hands ought not to have the blood
of the dead or injured workman upon them . . . ."'0 A rule which
would allow a negligent employer to reimburse himself at the ex-
pense of the third party and thus to escape responsibility for his
misconduct is distasteful to the courts. The "moral indignation"
caused by that prospect explains the North Carolina court's will-
ingness to deny the employer relief under these circumstances.
The same rule is not so easily accepted when the negligence at-
tributable to the employment enterprise is that of a co-worker of
the injured employee and when the employer is personally
blameless. If the reason for withholding reimbursement is indeed
retribution for the employer's misconduct, it may plausibly be con-
tended that he should not lose the right if the negligent is solely
that of his employee. Influenced by such reasoning, one prominent
writer has expressed the view that reimbursement properly is
denied only when the employer is personally at fault." "Moral in-
dignation" evaporates when the employer seeking reimbursement
was indeed a careful person, but yet was forced to pay compensation
for the tortious acts of others. Some courts have reached this conclu-
sion and grant reimbursement when the negligence is that of a co-
employee.42
40. Brown v. Southern Ry. Co., 204 N.C. 668, 671, 169 S.E. 419, 420 (1933).
41. A. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 75.23.
42. The Louisiana Supreme Court has declared that the negligence of a co-
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The force of such reasoning seems acceptable until the logical
extension of the rule is considered. When the employer's rights are
made to turn on the nature of his negligence, it might be consistent
to consider the basis of the third party's liability. The third party
often is liable only under respondeat superior or another form of
vicarious liability and is also an innocent party. Then the contest to
decide who should bear the costs involves two blameless parties,
each liable only under technical no-fault principles. The employer
already has received the benefit of the statutory exclusive remedy
provision; his liability for his employees' negligent acts is reduced to
the benefits prescribed by the compensation system. It is doubtful
that he also should get the further advantage of being reimbursed
even this amount, while the third party, equally free of fault, is re-
quired to pay full tort damages. In the suit for reimbursement, the
same principles should apply to both the employer and the third party
when each is chargeable with wrongdoing only through vicarious
liability.
The practical effects of a rule which would deny reimbursement
when the employer was personally negligent but not when the
carelessness was that of a co-employee should also be considered. In
the modern business world, most employers are corporations which
can carry on their business only through their employees. In such
cases the wrongful act which contributes to the plaintiff-employee's
injury must necessarily be that of a co-employee, as the corporate
employer is incapable of personal negligence. If the negligence of a
co-employee did not bar the corporation's right to reimbursement,
the cost of compensation would be shifted to the third party in the
majority of suits; seldom would the employment enterprise bear the
burden of the risks it has created. Such a rule would assure the cor-
poration of relief from all liability whenever a third party was
responsible, even in part, for the employee's injury. This is inconsis-
tent with the strong social policy of encouraging employers to pro-
vide safe working conditions for their employees.
A court which denies reimbursement when the employer is per-
sonally negligent faces a dilemma when it seeks to distinguish the
case in which a co-employee is the blameworthy party. In terms of
social policy and equity, the court might be wise to follow the lead
of North Carolina and to deny reimbursement whenever the
employee does not bar the employer's right to reimbursement of the compensation
benefits paid to his employee. The court based its holding on the language of LA. R.S.
23:1101 (1950), which grants the absolute right of reimbursement to all employers with
no requirement of blamelessness. Vidrine v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 263 La.
300, 268 So. 2d 233 (1972).
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employer or a co-employee is negligent. Such a rule is consistent
with the sound legal principle that one should not profit by his own
wrongdoing; the principle is morally palatable because it would treat
alike all those liable under no-fault principles. A contrary rule, re-
quiring the court to ascertain the basis of each party's liability,
would be difficult to administer and would complicate all third party
suits.
The complete denial of reimbursement whenever the employer
or a co-employee is negligent in any degree may, at first glance,
seem surprising. However, the reasoning behind the rule becomes
clearer when one examines the corresponding principles in ordinary
negligence actions. North Carolina is among the dwindling number
of states in which any contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff in a tort suit acts as a complete bar to recovery.'3 Joint
tort-feasors liable for negligence are entitled to contribution on a
pro rata basis, with degrees of fault irrelevant." In light of this
treatment of the ordinary negligence action, total denial of reim-
bursement to the employer when he is negligent in any degree is
not surprising. Also, the injured employee's contributory negligence
bars his right to recover any amount from the third party, and even
the blameless employer has no right to reimbursement when this is
the case. 5
The North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledges no analogy
between its approach to reimbursement in the third party suit and
true contribution.'6 Instead, the employer's fault is said to form the
basis for a "partial defense" entitling the third party to a pro tanto
reduction of the judgment against him in the amount of the compen-
sation benefits due. Nevertheless, the result is some degree of loss
sharing between the negligent parties. In the third party suit, the
employer's share is always the amount of compensation paid or
payable under the workmens' compensation act, regardless of what
his pro rata share of the tort judgment would be. In most cases the
employer escapes with a much lighter penalty than does the joint
tort-feasor, because the tort damages usually greatly exceed the
compensation benefits. However, the employer could conceivably be
required to pay more than the third party if the amount of compen-
43. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-139 (1887).
44. Section 1B-1 establishes the right to pro rata contribution among joint tort-
feasors. Section 1B-2 states that relative degrees of fault shall not be considered in
determining pro rata shares.
45. See Poindexter v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 235 N.C. 286, 287, 69 S.E.2d 495,
496 (1952).
46. Brown v. Southern Ry. Co., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E. 419 (1933).
[Vol. 41
WORKER'S COMPENSATION
sation due were nearly equal to the full tort damages. For example,
if full tort damages were $10,000 and the compensation benefits
were $7,500, the employer's share under a strict application of the
partial defense rule would be $7,500, and the third party would pay
only the excess of $2,500. Thus, the employer would pay more than
his $5,000 pro rata share, and the third party would receive a wind-
fall. The careless third party could escape liability altogether if the
compensation benefits exceeded the tort damages. Admittedly, the
total release of the third party would be an unusual occurrence. The
chance that the third party could be liable for less than his pro rata
share, regardless of his culpability, is a more probable and less
shocking occurrence, but is nonetheless inconsistent with placing the
loss upon the wrongdoer, the underlying philosophy of fault-based
liability.
North. Carolina retains that part of the original common law tort
rule which denies contribution to any tort-feasor who intentionally
commits a wrongful act. 7 To keep the defendants in tort actions and
in third party suits on equal footing, the third party who has inten-
tionally injured or killed an employee should be denied the benefit
of the partial defense based on the employer's negligence. The
employer guilty of the lesser wrongdoing, a careless rather than a
purposeful tort, could be granted reimbursement regardless of his
negligence, as a penalty to the third party.
The American majority rule prohibits a negligent third party
from securing contribution from a concurrently negligent employer, 8
but relief is also sought on indemnity principles. Indemnity, unlike
contribution, shifts the entire loss from one joint tort-feasor to
another who should pay instead." Even in ordinary negligence ac-
tions in which no tort-feasors with personal immunity are involved,
indemnity principles vary greatly from one jurisdiction to another.
There is common agreement only as to two bases for such recovery.
The simplest and most frequent basis is an express contract which
provides indemnity between the parties. Courts generally have held
that one who is liable vicariously under respondeat superior or
another no-fault principle is entitled to be repaid by the actual
wrongdoer. Other theories have been advanced and either accepted
or rejected on a state-by-state basis. For instance, one who by rely-
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-1(c) (1967).
48. A. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 76.21 states that "[tihe great majority of
jurisdictions have held that the employer whose concurring negligence contributed to
the employee's injury cannot be sued or joined by the third party as a joint tortfeasor,
whether under contribution statutes or at common law."
49. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 310.
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ing on the misrepresentations of another has caused damage often is
granted indemnity against the person who made the statements.
Considerable support also exists for the view that when one tort-
feasor has actively created a danger which results in injury to the
plaintiff, the party who is held liable due to his passive negligence
(i.e., because he merely failed to discover or remove the risk) is en-
titled to indemnity. Similarly, it has been suggested that one who is
guilty of ordinary negligence should be indemnified by a joint tort-
feasor who has committed an intentional or grossly negligent act.
Overall, there is little uniformity when indemnity is based on
grounds other than a contractual right or vicarious liability."
Defendants in North Carolina attempted to apply principles of
indemnity which had been recognized in ordinary tort actions to
third party suits in which the employer was guilty of concurrent
negligence. In one North Carolina case, Lovette v. Lloyd," the third
party asked for full indemnity from the employer under the passive-
active negligence dichotomy available in that state in pure
negligence actions. 2 The defendant claimed that the employer was
actively negligent in creating a risk of harm to the employee and,
therefore, should indemnify the third party, who was only passively
negligent in failing to remove the danger. The court rejected this
demand without regard for the nature of either party's negligence,
because both contribution and indemnity are available only when
there are joint tort-feasors, all of whom are liable in tort to the
plaintiff. The court reasoned that the employer's personal tort im-
munity shields him from the status of a joint tort-feasor and thus
relieves him of the obligation of indemnity.
Later that year in Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair
Co.,5" the supreme court reinforced its denial of common law indem-
50. Id. at 310-13.
51. 236 N.C. 663, 670, 73 S.E.2d 886, 892 (1953).
52. There is some support for the view that one who is guilty of only passive
neglect should be indemnified by the active wrongdoer, but the rule is far from being
universally accepted even in ordinary tort suits. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 312. The
right to indemnity based on the active-passive negligence dichotomy has been recognized
in North Carolina but in a suit which involved no elements of an employment enter-
prise. Gregg v. City of Wilmington, 155 N.C. 18, 70 S.E. 1070 (1911). The defendant in
Lovette failed to include sufficient facts in his answer to support a conclusion that his
negligence was passive in nature or that the employer's negligence was active. Conse-
quently, he would not have been entitled to indemnity even if his joint tort-feasor had
not been an employer endowed with personal immunity. In all probability the court
would have denied his demand regardless of the sufficiency of his proof of active and
passive negligence, because common law indemnity is available only against a joint
tort-feasor.
53. 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953).
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nity based on the active wrongdoing of the employer when the third
party was only passively negligent. By 1953 the North Carolina
legislature had inserted the partial defense rule based on employer
negligence in the compensation act." Nevertheless, the third party
complained that North Carolina law did nothing to alleviate the in-
equitable position of a passively negligent third party who ordinarily
would be entitled to common law indemnity. At that time the com-
pensation acts of a majority of the states also would have denied the
third party indemnity from the employer on any basis except ex-
press contract. The Hunsucker court acknowledged the majority
view and stated that, although common law indemnity is not
available against the employer, the North Carolina statute does
reduce the third party's liability by the amount of compensation
received by the employee and, therefore, is far more liberal than the
provisions of most jurisdictions. In addition, the court expressed a
willingness to uphold express indemnity contracts between the
employer and the third party or to grant relief when some special
legal relationship exists between the parties.
The supreme court was asked to enforce an express indemnity
agreement between a third party power company and one of its sub-
contractors, the plaintiff's employer in Gibbs v. Carolina Power &
Light Co.55 Accepting the invitation and upholding the third party's
right to indemnity, the court noted that the contract was clear,
unambiguous, and not against public policy. The defendant asserted
the employer's contributory negligence as an alternative defense,
but there was no factual finding on the issue, presumably because
the presence or absence of employer fault would be immaterial once
the -third party's contractual rights were established. In light of this
fact, the judicial enforcement of indemnity contracts between the
employer and the third party is relevant here only in revealing that
other bases for shifting the loss between the parties may exist.
Because the contractual rights existing between the third party and
the employer have nothing to do with the employee's tort action, the
court will not allow litigation of the indemnity contract to be inter-
jected into the plaintiff's suit against the third party in the absence
of extraordinary circumstances. Normally, the third party must
bring a separate suit against the employer on the indemnity con-
tract.
The procedural difficulties and constitutional problems
presented when a court denies an employer his reimbursement
rights in a proceeding to which he may not be a party have been
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1929).
55. 265 N.C. 459, 144 S.E.2d 393 (1965).
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solved neatly by the North Carolina legislature. The statute pro-
vides:
If the third party defending such proceeding, by answer duly
served on the employer, sufficiently alleges that actionable
negligence of the employer joined and concurred with the
negligence of the third party in producing the injury or death,
then an issue shall be submitted to the jury in such case as to
whether actionable negligence of the employer joined and con-
curred with the negligence of the third party in producing in-
jury or death. The employer shall have the right to appear, to be
represented, to introduce evidence, to cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and to argue to the jury as to this issue as fully as
though he were a party although not named or joined as a party
to the proceeding.56
Further, the amount of compensation which has been paid or is
payable is not admissible into evidence in an action against the third
party because of the danger that this might affect improperly the
jury's assessment of damages. Instead, the issue of the employer's
negligence is the last issue presented to the jury, and if the verdict
is that the employer was guilty of such conduct, the court reduces
the judgment by the amount of compensation due.
CALIFORNIA
California recently redefined the negligent employer's right to
reimbursement in the third party suit and abandoned its earlier
decision to follow North Carolina. 7 The change is a response to
judicial adoption of the comparative negligence standard in ordinary
tort actions, 8 rather then a reaction to modifications in compensa-
tion law. In fact, the entire history of the California employer's
rights against those who injure his employees closely follows that
state's development of negligence law.
The earliest decisions rendered after California enacted its
workers' compensation system upheld even the grossly negligent
employer's right to repayment of his compensation expenditure. 9
Reduction of the third party's liability by relieving him of the,
obligation of reimbursement was seen as a form of contribution
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(e) (1929).
57. Associated Constr. & Eng'r Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22
Cal. 3d 829, 587 P.2d 684, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1978).
58. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975).
59. Pacific Indem. Co. v. California Elec. Works, Ltd., 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 84 P.2d
313 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
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among joint tort-feasors, which was impermissible at that time."0
The abrogation of the anachronistic no-contribution rule in 195761
made the reasoning of the earlier decisions obsolete. A few years
later in Witt v. Jackson"2 the California Supreme Court, relying
almost exclusively on North Carolina's lead, held that the
employer's negligence defeated his right to reimbursement. Recogni-
tion of the right to contribution among joint tort-feasors generally,
coupled with the contributory negligence rule, played a large part in
the decision. These two precepts convinced the court that it was
proper to deny the employer's repayment claim completely if he was
guilty of even the slightest negligence and to reduce the third
party's liability by that amount in a manner similar to contribution. 3
Although the Witt court relied heavily on North Carolina case law, 4
the decision is not based expressly on assertion of the employer's
contributory negligence as a partial defense to the employee's claim.
The basis of the decision, although not clearly articulated in the opin-
ion, has been characterized as the attachment of an additional
substantive requirement to the employer's statutory subrogation
rights-the requirement of freedom from fault. 5 However, the most
recent pronouncement of the California Supreme Court refers to the
rule as the "Witt defense."6 The distinction is largely meaningless,
as loss distribution is the same under either rationale, but in California
the burden of proof may be on the employer rather than the third
party.
Even though California basically adhered to the minority view of
North Carolina, some differences existed between the two ap-
proaches. Most importantly, the formula announced in Witt reduced
the third party's liability only by the amount of compensation actually
paid prior to the judgment against him, 7 while in North Carolina,
the total amount of compensation due the employee, whether paid
before or after the third party suit, is deducted.6 This distinction
led to problems in California because employees are entitled to seek
60. Pacific Indem. Co. v. California Elec. Works, Ltd., 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 268, 84
P.2d 313, 318 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
61. CAL. [CIV. PROC.] CODE § 875 (Deering).
62. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).
63. 57 Cal. 2d at 73, 366 P.2d at 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
64. 57 Cal. 2d at 71, 366 P.2d at 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
65. Roe v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 884, 887, 528 P.2d
771, 773, 117 Cal. Rptr. 683, 685 (1974).
66. In Associated Construction, 22 Cal. 3d at 842, 587 P.2d at 692, 150 Cal. Rptr.
at 896, the court stated that "[t]he third party tortfeasor should be allowed to plead
the employer's negligence as a partial defense, in the manner of Witt."
67. 57 Cal. 2d at 73, 366 P.2d at 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
68. See note 37, supra.
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the remainder of the compensation benefits due from their
employers for the ultimate extent of their disability after comple-
tion of the third party suit. 9 In North Carolina the employer clearly
is entitled to no credit based on the employee's tort recovery,"0 but
Witt left unclear the negligent employer's right to a set-off. In the
succeeding decade the state district appellate courts reached incon-
sistent results; some denied the credit if the employer's negligence
had been established in the third party suit, while others allowed
the credit if the issue of employer fault was not raised until the
employee's later proceeding before the appeals board for the re-
mainder of his benefits.7 In 1974 the California Supreme Court
resolved the issue in Roe v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board."2 Because a decision that the negligent employer should be
denied the credit in all cases would increase recovery to the
employee, the court found it necessary to balance two competing
policies-the desire to prevent the employer from profiting by his
own wrongdoing and the traditional reluctance to allow double
recovery on the part of the employee." In the credit situation, the
court placed greater emphasis on the societal interest in not allow-
ing the wrongdoing employer to escape all responsibility for his mis-
conduct, especially since the beneficiary of the prohibition against
double recovery in the third party suit was seen as the third party
and not the employer."4 The Roe court held that the negligent
employer was to be denied a credit whether his carelessness was
established in the third party suit or in the employee's later pro-
ceeding before the board for full benefits." The employee enjoyed a
double recovery to the extent that his receipt of compensation
benefits was delayed until after final judgment or settlement of his
third party claim." The probability that this kind of extensive
duplication of damages will occur has lessened with the appearance
of comparative negligence, but the chance that there will be some
double recovery continues to exist.
69. See CAL. [LAB.] CODE §§ 3858 & 3861 (Deering).
70. See note 37, supra, and accompanying text.
71. Compare Corley v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. App. 3d
447, 99 Cal. Rptr. 242 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (employer whose fault was not litigated
in a third party. suit is entitled to credit in proceeding before appeals board) with
Nelsen v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 11 Cal. App. 3d 472, 89 Cal. Rptr.
638 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (finding of employer negligence in third party suit
precludes credit in later proceeding before appeals board).
72. 12 Cal. 3d 884, 528 P.2d 771, 117 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1974).
73. 12 Cal. 3d at 888, 528 P.2d at 774, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 686.





The Witt and Roe decisions were dictated to a large extent by
two principles of tort law formerly in effect in California-con-
tributory negligence and pro rata contribution among joint tort-
feasors. Shortly after Roe, these two rules were abrogated by the
California Supreme Court and replaced with comparative fault prin-
ciples in the 1975 case of Li v. Yellow Cab Co." The court judicially
adopted comparative negligence in response to its belief that liability
for loss should be assigned in proportion to the amount of
negligence of each responsible party, rather than on an arbitrary
virile shares basis.7' The decision expanded the right of the con-
tributorily negligent employee to recover from the third party by
imposing a reduction based on the employee's share of responsibility
for his own injury, rather than finding contributory negligence a
complete bar to recovery.7 ' But the California court did not make it
clear whether the employer's reimbursement and credit rights also
would be adjusted in light of these developments. In fact, Li cautioned
against an assumption that the decision supplied the rule for alloca-
tion of responsibility in all situations."0 Nevertheless, in keeping
with its policy of reconciling the tort and compensation systems, the
court in Associated Construction & Engineering Co. v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board"1 refashioned the rights and duties of
the negligent employer and the third party defendants in accord
with the earlier Li decision. The Associated Construction &
Engineering Co. case marks an important step in the evolution of
the third party suit in response to changes in pure tort law. The ex-
clusive remedy provision of the compensation scheme 2 precluded a
comprehensive application of comparative negligence principles to
the negligent employer. 3 But the Witt-Roe total denial of reimburse-
ment and credit was based on the doctrine of contributory
negligence, and the rule of these cases had to be adjusted in light of
Li."'
The judicial conversion to comparative negligence compelled the
California court to depart substantially from its North Carolina
heritage, but even today there is a similarity in the jurisprudence of
the two states. Both states' compensation schemes are progressive
77. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
78. Id.
79. 13 Cal. 3d at 812, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864. See also The
Supreme Court of California 1974-1975-Foreword. Comparative Negligence at
Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CAL. L. REV. 239, 241 (1976).
80. 13 Cal. 3d at 826, 532 P.2d at 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
81. 22 Cal. 3d 829, 587 P.2d 684, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1978).
82. CAL. [LAB.] CODE § 3601 (Deering).
83. Id.
84. 22 Cal. 3d at 840, 587 P.2d at 690-91, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
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attempts to structure the employer's rights in at least partial con-
formity with the tort system which governs the assertion of a reim-
bursement or credit claim. The divergence of the two schemes
results from the fact that North Carolina remains a contributory
negligence state,85 while California has carried its philosophy of
fault-based liability one step further through the adoption of com-
parative negligence.8 To maintain the balance between the tort and
compensation systems which the California courts had previously
achieved by following the North Carolina lead, the supreme court
was forced to reassess the rights of the concurrently negligent
employer and third party. The court determined that, to the extent
that comparative negligence was consistent with the employer's im-
munity from tort liability, the parties responsible for the damage
should thereafter share liability for the employee's injury in propor-
tion to their percentages of fault.87 Applying this principle, the court
concluded that the negligent employer should receive no reimburse-
ment or credit until the compensation he had paid exceeded the
amount for which he would be liable if he were an ordinary defen-
dant.88 The application of this rule will be examined in the context of
the reimbursement and credit situations.
REIMBURSEMENT
The employer may seek reimbursement by joining his
employee's tort suit or by bringing a separate action against the
third party if the employee has settled his claim.88 When reimburse-
ment is sought in the employee's suit against the third party, the
facts necessary to apply comparative negligence concepts must be
established there. The trier of fact assesses the parts that the
employer, the third party, and the employee played in causing the
injury, and specific percentages of fault are assigned to each party. 1
The employer's share of the employee's total tort recovery under
negligence principles is determined by multiplying the percentage of
fault assigned to the employer by the full damages incurred. The
court must then deduct this sum from the third party's liability.
However, the entire amount is subtracted only if it is equal to or ex-
ceeded by the amount of compensation benefits which have been
85. See notes 43 & 44, supra, and accompanying text.
86. See note 79, supra.
87. 22 Cal. 3d at 842-43, 587 P.2d at 691-92, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 985-96.
88. 22 Cal. 3d at 842, 587 P.2d at 692, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
89. CAL. [LAB.) CODE §§ 3601, 3852-53, 3856(b) (Deering).
90. Associated Constr. & Eng'r Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22




paid prior to that time.92 If the employer's true percentage share is
less than the compensation he had paid, only the amount for which
he would be liable as an ordinary tort-feasor (and not the actual
amount of compensation paid) is deducted from the third party's
liability." The employer is reimbursed the difference. On the other
hand, if the employer's tort liability would equal or exceed the com-
pensation benefits received by the employee, the full amount of com-
pensation paid is subtracted from the judgment against the third
party. 4 In this case the employer is denied his reimbursement lien,
because the contribution he has made does not exceed what his
share of the judgment would be if he were an ordinary tort-feasor.
This scheme is illustrated by a situation in which the employee's
tort damages are $15,000 and his employer has paid $5,000 in com-
pensation benefits prior to judgment.95 If the employer and the third
party are each found fifty percent negligent, the employer's share
under pure comparative negligence rules would be fifty percent of
$15,000 or $7,500. The third party is eligible for a maximum reduc-
tion of $7,500, the employer's true share. However, in this instance
the reduction will be limited to $5,000, the amount of compensation
which has in fact been paid. The employer is entitled to no reim-
bursement, because his contribution of $5,000 in compensation
benefits falls short of his actual percentage share of $7,500. The
third party receives limited relief, but his liability is greater than it
would be in a situation in which his joint tort-feasor enjoys no per-
sonal immunity from negligence claims. As in all third party suits,
the innocent employee's right to receive full tort damages is
preserved. The employer's tort immunity is intact, since he is not
required to contribute more than the amount of compensation he has
already paid.
In a second example using the same amounts of tort damages
and compensation paid, the result is altered if the employer is only
ten percent negligent and the third party is ninety percent at fault.
The employer's percentage share would then be ten percent of
$15,000, or $1,500. The third party's tort liability would be reduced,
but only by the employer's virile share, $1,500, and not by the
amount of compensation which had in fact been paid. The employer




95. The following computations do not take into account the payment of "expenses
or attorney's fees" within the meaning of section 3861 of the California Labor Code
when figuring the employee's net tort recovery.
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his contribution of $5,000 in compensation benefits exceeded his ac-
tual percentage share of $1,500.
In a third example, the possibility of the employee's own partial
responsibility for his harm should be considered. Associated Con-
struction did not involve employee carelessness; the court expressly
disclaims any holding on how such negligence would effect the pro-
portional contribution of the employer." Presumably, the employee's
total recovery would first be reduced by his own percentage of
negligence, just as in any other tort suit. The liability of the
employer and the third party would continue to be calculated on
their percentage shares of the entire tort damages. In this way one
hundred percent of the loss will be apportioned among the responsi-
ble parties. If the employees were ten percent negligent, the
employer ten percent negligent, and the third party eighty percent
negligent, the recovery would be as follows: the third party's liability
of $15,000 would be reduced by $1,500 for the employee's negligence
and by $1,500 for the employer's negligence, to $12,000, which is
eighty percent of $15,000. The employer who had paid $5,000 would
be entitled to reimbursement of $3,500, the amount by which the
compensation he paid exceeded his percentage share of liability. In
this example the employee does not receive full tort damages, but
the involvement of the compensation system is not the cause of the
partial recovery. Instead, the employee suffers a reduction in his
recovery for his contributory negligence, as any other less-than-
perfect plaintiff would under the rules of comparative negligence.
At this point it may be worthwhile to note the general objec-
tives of the law which are involved and sometimes endangered when
a negligent employer claims reimbursement from a third party. The
soundness of the decision in Associated Construction may be judged
in light of its tendency to promote to the fullest extent possible each
of the somewhat contradictory goals. First, the employee's right to
recover complete damages from any tort-feasor, other than his
employer, should not be diminished by the fact that the employee
also is entitled to receive compensation. The concurrent negligence
of the employer and his immunity to contribution claims do not
lessen the third party's liability. The employee's recovery will be
reduced for his own negligence, but otherwise he should receive
complete reparation for all elements of his injury. After Associated
Construction apportionment of the loss will vary, depending on each
party's degree of negligence and on the amount of compensation
which has been paid prior to the judgment; but, regardless of the
96. 22 Cal. 3d at 842 n.9, 587 P.2d at 692 n.9, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 896 n.9.
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ultimate distribution of the loss, the employee will receive the sum
he would get if the compensation system were not involved.
The second goal is preservation of the employer's personal im-
munity from tort claims resulting from injuries to his employees, a
right important for equitable and economic reasons. To require the
employer to pay compensation for all work-related injuries on a no-
fault basis and, at the same time, to subject him to tort liability to
his employees would be unfair and perhaps even disastrous. The
court in Associated Construction balanced the employer's rights and
obligations to reach an acceptable compromise. Since the all-or-
nothing rule of Witt has been abandoned, the careless employer will
be entitled to partial reimbursement if the compensation paid ex-
ceeds his true share of the tort damages. Conversely, if the
employer's liability as an ordinary tort-feasor exceeds the compensa-
tion he has paid, he will receive no reimbursement, but he will also
bear no further responsibility for contribution to the third party.
The employer is simultaneously protected by both negligence and
compensation principles, since he never pays more than either his
proportionate share of the tort damages or the compensation remit-
ted before judgment in the third party suit, whichever is less. This
double protection is justifiable when one considers the alternatives.
If the employer were always denied reimbursement of the entire
amount of his compensation, regardless of how great or slight his
negligence, either the employee would receive a double recovery or
the third party would enjoy an undeserved windfall. In either case
the employer who supposedly exchanged tort immunity for no-fault
compensation liability would be the loser. Instead of supporting such
an unfair rule, Associated Construction assures the financial integrity
of the compensation system and, at the same time, sufficiently
punishes both the employer and the third party to deter careless
conduct.
The third objective is accomodation, so far as possible, of the
third party's right to contribution from his joint tort-feasors. This
goal can be met only to the extent that relief is compatible with the
preservation of the employer's tort immunity. Indeed, if the
employee is contributorily negligent, the third party's liability is
reduced, but this is a feature of comparative negligence and has
nothing to do with the compensation system. Since the California
Supreme Court's decision in Witt, the third party enjoys a decrease
in liability similar in effect to contribution whenever the employer is
even partially responsible for the employee's harm. 7 In earlier deci-
97. 57 Cal. 2d at 73, 366 P.2d at 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
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sions the reduction always equaled the amount of compensation paid
prior to the third party judgment." The employer received no reim-
bursement whatsoever, but he had no further liability to the third
party for contribution. Thus, the employer's tort immunity was
preserved to that extent. The Associated Construction decision in-
corporates comparative negligence into the reimbursement formula
in a way that retains the employer's freedom from tort liability. The
balance continues to favor the employer, with less emphasis placed
on the third party's right to contribution. However, in light of the
American majority rule which grants even the negligent employer
the right to reimbursement and casts the entire burden on the third
party in all cases, the California rule does not seem harsh.9
CREDIT RIGHTS
To this point, inquiry into the California compensation scheme
has been limited to the effect of comparative negligence on the
employer's right to reimbursement. When the issue of employer
negligence is raised in the context of a credit claim, the respective
rights of the parties are also altered by the Li decision. The
employee who has received remuneration for his tort claim, either
by judgment or settlement, has the right to seek the remainder of
his compensation benefits from his employer in a proceeding before
the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board."' Often the employer
has paid only temporary disability benefits prior to disposition of
the third party claim, and he may seek to avoid further payments to
the employee by asserting a credit or set-off against his liability in
the amount of the employee's tort recovery. At this point the
employee raises the issue of the employer's negligence as grounds
for denial of the credit. If there has been a percentage determina-
tion of the employer's responsibility for the accident and of the
employee's damages in a third party suit, the finding has a res
judicata effect in a later proceeding before the board. 1' If no prior
resolution of these issues has taken place, they must be decided by
98. Id.
99. See note 14, supra.
100. See note 69, supra.
101. In Associated Construction, the employee reached an out-of-court settlement
with the third party tort-feasor, making any direct statements about the res judicata
effect of a prior court determination of the issues irrelevant. Although Roe also involved
a settlement of the employee's third party claim, the court suggested that improper
manipulation of the reimbursement and credit cycles could be reduced by a system in
which both the trial court and the Worker's Compensation Board were bound to accept
the other tribunal's prior determination of the employer's fault and the employee's
damages. 12 Cal. 3d at 892, 528 P.2d at 777, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
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the appeals board.1' 2 The employer receives the benefit of the third
party judgment only after he has paid his share of the employee's
tort damages. 3 A sufficient amount may have been paid prior to the
third party suit. If not, the employer must make up the deficiency
before the board will allow the credit; then the net amount of the
tort recovery is credited against the employer's remaining liability
to reduce it pro tanto.0 1 Theoretically, the employer should have to
pay the same amount of compensation to be eligible for the credit
whether the employee's tort recovery came by way of settlement or
judgment. However, discrepancies are certain to exist, depending on
whether the issues of fact are decided in court or in an ad-
ministrative proceeding. But these differences are likely to be
minor, since much of the same evidence on damages and fault would
be presented before either tribunal.
Before the employer is entitled to a credit, his total payments to
the employee must equal the amount that his contribution liability
to the third party would be if the employer were considered an or-
dinary tort-feasor. Choosing this amount may seem arbitrary, par-
ticularly in light of the fact that it is the employee rather than the
third party who receives the benefit of this requirement. However,
the logic of Associated Construction becomes more apparent when
the decision is viewed in light of its main purpose, to deter careless
conduct on the part of the employer."5 The court shows more con-
cern for enforcing the equitable principle that a negligent employer
should not profit by his own wrong than for increasing the
employee's recovery or decreasing the third party's liability.' Even
denying reimbursement to the blameworthy employer in the third
party suit, which incidentally serves to reduce the third party's tort
liability, is viewed more as a punishment of the employer than as a
means of preserving the third party's right to contribution. Requir-
ing the employer to pay his true share of the tort damages is the
method used to assure that he is appropriately penalized for his
misconduct.
Although the negligent employer remains immune to solidary
liability for the entire tort award to his employee, he loses the tradi-
tional protection of the compensation act when he is forced to pay
his percentage of the tort judgment before he receives any credit.
102. This was the conclusion noted in Associated Construction. 22 Cal. 3d at 845,
587 P.2d at 694-95, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 896-97.
103. 22 Cal. 3d. at 843, 587 P.2d at 692, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
104. Id.
105. 22 Cal. 3d at 846, 587 P.2d at 694-95, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 898-99.
106. 12 Cal. 3d at 888-89, 528 P.2d at 774-75, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 686-87.
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Once payments by the employer equal what he would pay as an or--
dinary defendant, he should enjoy the right to contribution that is
granted to other tort-feasors. After Associated Construction, an
employer who pays this amount is granted the right to receive a
benefit similar to contribution by way of a credit against his remain-
ing liability after the third party suit. The Associated Construction
court countered arguments that its decision allowed the negligent
employer to profit from his own wrongdoing by stating:
It is contended that such an extension would permit a negligent
employer to profit from its own wrong and thus violate the im-
portant policy effectuated through the Witt-Roe doctrine. Under
the rule we announce, however, the employer does not so profit;
no credit is available until the employer has fully satisfied its
share of tort damages. Allowing the concurrently negligent
employer a credit limited in this fashion is rational if non-
negligent employers are to be permitted credit; each profits, if
at all, only to the extent it committed no wrong."°7
Examples also help explain the complex California credit rules.
If an employer has paid $20,000 in compensation benefits before an
employee's successful suit against a third party, if full tort damages
are $90,000, and if the employer and the third party are both held
fifty percent responsible for the damages, in the third party tort
suit the distribution of responsibility would be as follows: the
employer would be denied reimbursement because his share (fifty
percent) of $90,000, or $45,000, exceeds the contribution of $20,000
which he made through compensation payments. The third party's
liability of $90,000 would be reduced by the employer's share, but
only up to the $20,000 compensation which has been paid, leaving
the third party liable for $70,000. The innocent employee receives
full tort damages of $90,000.
After prosecution of the third party suit, the employee is free to
seek from his employer further compensation benefits based on the
ultimate extent of the employee's disability.' If the board classifies
the employee as totally and permanently disabled and if full benefits
for such a disability are $70,000, the employer can claim no credit
for the amount received from the third party until compensation
paid to the employee reaches the employer's true comparative
liability of $45,000. The employer has already paid $20,000 in tem-
porary disability benefits; thus he must remit an additional $25,000
to the employee to bring his total up to $45,000 before he will be en-
107. 22 Cal. 3d at 846, 587 P.2d at 694, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
108. See note 69, supra.
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titled to a credit. The $45,000 that the employer has now paid is ap-
plied to the $70,000 due the employee for total and permanent
disability; this payment reduces the debt to $25,000. After this pay-
ment, the $70,000 that the employee received from the third party
may be applied to the employer's residual liability. Thus, the credit
of the $70,000 tort recovery relieves the employer of any further
responsibility to the employee.
On the surface it may seem that the employer has been forced
to contribute to the tort judgment as an ordinary tort-feasor. Indeed
the employer does pay the share for which he would be liable if pure
comparative contribution principles were applied to him in the third
party suit. However, the employer has reduced the third party's
liability by only $20,000. The employer's ultimate loss is what his
share of the damages would be if the compensation act were not in-
volved, but the employee, rather than the third party, benefits from
employer's increased liability. From the third party's point of view,
contribution clearly is not taking place. Even after Associated Con-
struction the employee retains to some extent the benefit of the
double recovery sanctioned in Roe, when contributory negligence
was the rule; but after the adoption of comparative negligence, the
compensation and tort damages overlap only to the extent that the
employer's percentage share exceeds the benefits he has paid prior
to judgment.
A different situation occurs when the employer has paid $20,000
in compensation benefits before resolution of the employee's claim
against the third party, and full tort damages are determined to be
$90,000. However, in this example the employer is ten percent,
rather than fifty percent negligent, and the third party is held ninety
percent responsibile for the accident. In the third party suit, the
employer's initial compensation payment of $20,000 exceeds his pro-
portional share of $9,000. The employer is entitled to reimbursement
of $11,000, the amount by which is contribution exceeds his share of
liability under comparative negligence. The third party must bear
ninety percent of the $90,000 loss, and the employee receives full
tort damages because he was guilty of no contributory negligence.
Later, when the employee seeks full compensation benefits of
$70,000 for total and permanent disability, the employer already will
have contributed his $9,000 share of the tort judgment. Thus, the
employer is entitled to credit the entire $81,000 received from the
third party against his remaining compensation liability of $61,000
($70,000-$9,000) to cancel it completely.
When the employer asserts credit rights based on a third party
settlement rather than a judgment, the application of comparative
19801
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negligence principles is more complex. Following the Associated
Construction analysis, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
then must determine the appropriate contribution by the employer
which will entitle him to credit rights, since there has been no prior
judicial determination of the employer's percentage of negligence or
of the employee's full tort damages. °9 The supreme court in Roe
upheld the authority of the appeals board to determine such fault
issues over objections of unconstitutionality and of the board's lack
of experience in adjudicating negligence claims. " ° Specifically, the
board must determine: (1) the degree of fault of the employer and (2)
the total tort damages to which the employee is entitled."' The
employer cannot credit the settlement against his liability until he
has paid the employee an amount equal to the employer's propor-
tional share of the tort damages. The computation is identical to the
case in which the employer's degree of fault and the employee's tort
damages are established in a judicial proceeding. The only dif-
ference is that when there has been a settlement, the fault and
damages issues are determined by the board rather than by the
court.
RIGHT OF EMPLOYEE TO SETTLE THIRD PARTY SUITS
Settlements between injured employees and third party defen-
dants affect, but do not erase, the employer's reimbursement and
credit claims. From codification of compensation law in California in
1937 until 1971, section 3859 of the California Labor Code required
the consent of both the employer and the employee for a valid set-
tlement agreement with the third party. "2 This consent requirement
encouraged simultaneous resolution of all issues in the third party
suit; the requirement also served to "protect the rights and in-
terests of employer and employee and to prevent or discourage
either of them from obtaining a recovery from the third party at the
expense or the disadvantage of the other.". 3 The rule made sense
when one considered that the proof required for the employee's tort
recovery and the employer's reimbursement claim were essentially
the same-the employee's freedom from contributory negligence
and the third party's responsibility for the employee's harm. At this
time the employer's negligence played no part in the compensation
109. 22 Cal. 3d at 843, 587 P.2d at 692, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
110. 12 Cal. 3d at 891-92, 528 P.2d at 776-77, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 688-89.
111. The Associated Construction court made this issue clear. 22 Cal. 3d at 843,
587 P.2d at 692, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
112. CAL. [LAB.] CODE § 3859 (Deering).
113. Brown v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 3 Cal. 3d 427, 431-32, 476
P.2d 105, 108, 90 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740 (1970).
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scheme, but in 1961 Witt added an element to the employer's claim
for reimbursement which was not essential to the employee's suit-
the employer's freedom from fault. 14 After Witt the negligent
employer had no right to reimbursement, but he retained his veto
power over the employee's settlement negotiations with the third
party. As a result, the Associated Construction employer enjoyed a
tactical advantage in his dealings with the third party which did not
accurately reflect his chances of succeeding in his claim for reim-
bursement at trial." A third party who desired to settle the larger
employee claims against him was forced to "buy" the employer's
consent by reimbursing him at least part of the compensation paid,
when in reality the employer's fault deprived him of the legal right
to be repaid at all.
In 1970 the supreme court, rather than the legislature, took ac-
tion in Brown v. Superior Court of San Bernadino County"" to cor-
rect the situation. The court considered a situation in which the
third party's liability to the employee and the lack of any claimed
contributory negligence on the part of the employee were not deter-
mined or conceded in the settlement, which was executed without
the consent of the employer. The release of the third party was held
invalid, but the clear implication of the opinion was that when these
issues were resolved in the settlement agreement, the employee
could reach an independent compromise of his claim against the
third party without the employer's consent.1 7 The employer would
be required to pursue his reimbursement rights in a separate pro-
ceeding against the third party. In this situation the employer would
have no more difficult a burden of proof than if the employee were
also a party to the suit. In fact, the litigation would be less com-
plicated, since the issue would be reduced to the employer's own
lack of negligence. 18
The next year the legislature responded to this decision by
amending the consent provision of the Labor Code. For a settlement
to foreclose the claims of all parties, the written consent of both the
employer and the employee is still required. 9 However, the right
accorded the employee by judicial decision to settle without the
employer's consent was codified by the addition of subdivision (b) to
section 3859:
114. See notes 54-58, supra, and accompanying text.
115. 22 Cal. 3d at 837, 587 P.2d at 688, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
116. 3 Cal. 3d 427, 476 P.2d 105, 90 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1970).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. CAL. [LAB.] CODE § 3859 (Deering).
1980]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this
chapter, an employee may settle and release any claim he may
have against a third party without the consent of the employer.
Such settlement or release shall be subject to the employer's
right to proceed to recover compensation he has paid in accord-
ance with Section 3852.120
Section 3852 embodies the employer's right to bring an action
against the third party to recover the compensation he has paid.
121
The language of sections 3859 and 3852, when read together,
leave no doubt that the employee's right to enter into an indepen-
dent settlement agreement does not affect the employer's right to
reimbursement.1 2 ' The employer has the same rights and the same
burden of proof, whether his claim is prosecuted by lien, by in-
tervention in the employee's tort suit, or in a separate action
against the third party. The determination of third party negligence
in the employee's suit or the concession of this issue in the settle-
ment has a res judicata effect, and the employer need not
reestablish this element of his claim.22 The employer need establish
only that he is free of fault to receive complete repayment or that
his compensation payments exceed his percentage of the damages to
receive partial reimbursement.
Because the legislature did not modify the credit provisions of
the act in response to changes in the settlement procedure, the ex-
tent of the employer's post-settlement credit rights was uncertain
after the amendments. Associated Construction, the 1978 case which
integrated comparative negligence into the third party suit, also
answered this question.' The court found that the legislature did
not intend to deny the employer a credit based on the employee's in-
dependent settlement of his third party claim.125 An opposite view
would have forced the employer to file suit against the third party
for reimbursement in order to receive any benefit from the settle-
ment. To take full advantage of his rights, the employer would be
required to postpone this action until the employee's permanent
benefits were fixed by the board, because the employer would have
no right to recover amounts not yet determined to be due.' The
court believed this to be an undue hardship on the employer. in
120. Id.
121. CAL. [LAB.] CODE § 3852 (Deering).
122. Associated Constr. & Eng'r Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22




126. 22 Cal. 3d at 839-40, 587 P.2d at 690, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
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short, the court found no reason for the employer to be denied the
right to seek a credit based on the employee's independent settle-
ment contract. The employer is not required to reestablish the third
party's negligence in a credit claim. Instead, he only has to prove his
future liability for compensation and to defeat assertions that he has
been negligent to an extent which would deny him the right to a
credit altogether.
INDEMNITY
The California history of the third party's right to indemnity
from the employer is unique. Most states deny both contribution and
indemnity, because the employer's personal immunity from
negligence claims by his employees prevents his acquiring the status
of a joint tort-feasor."12 The California rule regarding contribution from
the concurrently negligent employer is consistent with this view-
point. The employer may be denied reimbursement as a penalty for
his misconduct, but he is never required to pay more to the third
party.12 Although the employer's tort immunity defeats claims for
contribution, the immunity has not always been effective against
third party requests for indemnity.
Prior to 1959 the employer was subject to liability under the
common law doctrine of implied indemnity.'29 In some cases the
employer was required to indemnify the third party when the
negligence of the employer was active and the third party was
merely passively negligent."' Other cases held that a contract be-
tween the employer and the third party to perform services in a
specified manner and to be "responsible for . . . any and all
damages" resulting from its operations could form the basis for an
implied agreement to indemnify. 3 Under either theory of common
law indemnity, the employer was subject to the dual burden of com-
pensation liability through direct payments to the employee and of
tort liability as the result of an obligation to indemnify the third
party for any amounts the employee recovered through a third party
suit.
127. Comment, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice: Its Effect on the Doctrines of Contri-
bution and Indemnity as Applied in Illinois Workmen's Compensation Third-Party Ac-
tions, 1978 So. ILL. L.J. 556, 560 (1978).
128. See text at notes 10-22, supra.
129. Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. D. Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal. App. 2d 604, 57 Cal. Rptr.
701 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Morse, 6 Cal. App. 3d 707, 86
Cal. Rptr. 7 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
130. Id.
131. San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance Co., 162
Cal. App. 2d 434, 448, 328 P.2d 785, 794 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
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In 1959 the legislature responded to the inequity of the double
burden on the employer by enacting section 3864 of the Labor
Code. "'32 Under this statute, the employer is no longer required to in-
demnify the third party in the absence of an express written indem-
nification agreement executed prior to the injury. The legislature
felt that imposing an obligation to indemnify on the employer con-
travened the exclusive remedy theory of the compensation statutes
and undermined the stability of the entire system.'33
The California statute is desirable in light of the preference for
freedom of contract among equal parties. In practical terms, the
only parties who will execute specific indemnity contracts will be
employers and third parties who enter into business ventures for
exchanging goods or services. Basing the right to indemnity on the
existence of a written contract ensures that both parties will know
who ultimately will be liable for tort damages to the employees. The
employer who has agreed to indemnify the third party will then be
aware of his responsibility to procure liability insurance and will in-
clude its cost when pricing his product or service.
Since the statute was enacted, questions regarding the third
party's right to indemnity have centered on the sufficiency of terms
of the contract. The cases have not required that the employer
specifically agree to reimburse the third party or to hold him
harmless for judgments arising out of injuries to the employer's own
workers. 3' On the contrary, an agreement for the employer to in-
demnify the third party for "any and all claims, suits, or liability...
for injuries to persons" is broad enough to cover claims by
employees of the indemnitor against the third party.'35 Similarly, a
contract providing coverage of "all claims for damages to persons...
growing out of the execution of the work" includes recovery by the
employees of the indemnitor against the third party in the absence
of extrinsic evidence supporting a contrary conclusion." 6 The
language which has been held sufficient to constitute a specific in-
demnity contract is so broad that it is likely that many of the
pre-1959 cases based on implied indemnity would be resolved in the
same way today.
An indemnity contract which does not specifically entitle the
132. CAL. [LAB.) CODE § 3864 (Deering).
133. Conley & Sayre, Rights of Indemnity, 13 HASTINGs L.J. 214, 219 n.29 (1961).
134. Gonzales v. R. J. Novic Constr. Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 798, 575 P.2d 1190, 144
Cal. Rptr. 408 (1978).
135. Herman Christensen & Sons, Inc. v. Paris Plastering Co., 61 Cal. App. 3d 246,
247, 132 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (1976).
136. Gonzales v. R. J. Novick Constr. Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 798, 810, 575 P.2d 1190,
1197, 144 Cal. Rptr. 408, 415 (1978).
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third party to indemnity regardless of his own negligence is a
"general" indemnity clause."7 Such a clause has been held to provide
indemnity for a loss which results in part from the third party's
passive negligence but has not been interpreted to provide indemnity
to the third party who is actively negligent in causing the
employee's injury." At the present time, the inclusion of the
general indemnity clause is the employer's only realistic hope of
escaping the burden of repaying the third party with whom any sort
of indemnity contract has been executed.
ILLINOIS
The most extreme method of resolving the dispute between the
employer and the third party involves subjecting the negligent
employer to unlimited liability for contribution and indemnity. Sur-
prisingly, this approach is not unknown in American jurisdictions. In
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Package Machinery Co., ' Illinois became
the second state"' to apportion the employee's damages between the
negligent employer and the third party according to the rules
governing contribution between ordinary joint tort-feasors. This
task was performed with little regard to the equally applicable prin-
ciples of the compensation act. In Skinner the Illinois court con-
sidered a defendant manufacturer's request for contribution from
the employer based on the latter's negligence. The court held that,
although the manufacturer was responsible under the theory of
strict liability for defective products, his request for contribution
alleging the employer's negligence in misuse of the product or
assumption of the risk of the defect stated a valid cause of action."'
The amount due from the employer would depend on the relative
degrees to which the third party's manufacture of a defective pro-
duct and the employer's subsequent misuse of the product or
assumption of the risk caused the employee's injury."2 The decision
is problematic, dictating major changes in both tort and compensa-
tion law without adequate consideration or guidance from the ma-
jority.
Prior to Skinner the Illinois rules regarding contribution and in-
demnity were badly in need of revision. Relying on the old English
137. Markley v. Beagle, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809, 429 P.2d 129 (1967).
138. Id.
139. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1978).
140. New York was the first. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282
N.E.2d 288 (1972).




common law rule," ' Illinois adhered to the view that contribution is
not allowed among joint tort-feasors.'" Early decisions attempted to
restrict the rule's application to intentional wrongdoers' or to only
those tort-feasors who acted in concert,' but for the most part
these exceptions gave way to the broad general rule denying con-
tribution. The continued existence of this concept has been widely
criticized as inappropriate and unfair, especially when applied, as in
Illinois, to those whose misconduct is negligent rather than inten-
tional."7 Even the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged the ques-
tionable nature of the doctrine, but nevertheless persisted in its ap-
plication."8
Since Illinois courts applied the "no contribution" rule to even
negligent joint tort-feasors, defendants cast in judgment were
unable to recoup any part of their loss from others also responsible
for the damage. Because of the unfairness of this result, principles
of indemnity, not prohibited by the "no contribution" rule, were suc-
cessfully used to shift the entire loss from one tort-feasor to
another. Three broad bases for indemnity have been recognized in
Illinois: the express indemnity agreement;" 9 indemnity based on an
implied contractual agreement or the existence of a special relation-
ship (e.g., vicarious liability);5 ' and common law indemnity. 5' Com-
mon law indemnity, the variety most important to the Skinner case,
rests upon the theory that a tort-feasor who was actively negligent
should indemnify a tort-feasor who was merely passively
143. Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). The use of Merryweather
as authority for the rule that there should be no contribution among joint tort-feasors
liable on the basis of their negligence has often been questioned. In Merryweather the
defendants acted in concert and intentionally when they wrongfully converted the
plaintiff's goods. At most, the rule of no contribution among joint tort-feasors should
be limited to these unusual facts and not applied to those whose negligent acts combined
to cause injury. See Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for
Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REv. 176, 177-78 (1898).
144. STUDY COMM. REPORT ON INDEMNITY, THIRD PARTY ACTIONS AND EQUITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS, REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 202 (1976).
145. See Wanack v. Michels, 215 Ill. 87, 74 N.E. 84 (1905); Farwell v. Becker, 129
Ill. 261, 21 N.E. 792 (1889).
146. Skala v. Lehon, 343 Ill. 602, 175 N.E. 832 (1931).
147. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 307.
148. Carver v. Grossman, 55 Ill. 2d 507, 305 N.E.2d (1973).
149. John Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill. 331, 141 N.E.
739 (1923).
150. Holcomb v. Flavin, 34 Ill. 2d 558, 216 N.E.2d 811 (1966); Blaszak v. Union Tank
Car Co., 37 Ill. App. 2d 12, 184 N.E.2d 808 (1962); Moroni v. Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 24
Ill. App. 2d 534, 165 N.E.2d 346 (1960).




negligent.152 Because of the difficulty involved in applying this stan-
dard on a case-by-case basis, courts have attempted to define the
terms "active" and "passive" in various ways. One frequently cited
definition is found in Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries,5 ' in which the
court said that "[o]ne is passively negligent if he merely fails to act
in fulfillment of a duty of care which the law imposes on him ....
One is actively negligent if he participates in some manner in the
conduct or omission which caused the injury."
The widespread use of this theory of indemnity has produced
somewhat ironic results. Before Skinner a passively negligent party
could not shift part of his loss to another through contribution
because of the non-contribution rule; however, in some cases the
passive party was entitled to shift the entire loss to his actively
negligent joint tort-feasor through use of the active-passive theory
of indemnity. This seems an improper use of the doctrines of con-
tribution and indemnity. When the defendant has been negligent in
any degree, whether passively or actively, it is fair to require him to
bear at least part of the responsibility for the damage he has caused. If
a court wishes to divide equitably the damages in this siutation, con-
tribution is the proper mechanism. Indemnity is more appropriately
reserved for situations in which policy and equity demand that the
party cast in judgment be relieved of liability entirely because of the
existence of a contract to that effect or because he lacks personal
fault. The use of indemnity in situations in which both the indem-
nitor and the indemnitee are at fault merely replaces one inequit-
able concept, the non-contribution rule, with another just as unfair.
In Illinois there seems to be no clear understanding of the distinc-
tion between contribution and indemnity. The confusion may stem
from an early case in which the court discussed exceptions to the
rule of non-contribution between tort-feasors, all of which exceptions
appeared to include active-passive indemnification.' This inter-
mingling of terms led practitioners to conclude that contribution is a
form of partial indemnity and indemnity an extreme form of con-
tribution.55 As recently as Skinner, the Illinois Supreme Court refer-
red to indemnity based on the active-passive negligence of the tort-
feasors as an exception to the non-contribution rule. 6' The failure of
152. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 312.
153. 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 193, 229 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1st Dist. 1967), quoting King v.
Timber Structures, Inc., 240 Cal. App. 2d 178, 49 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1966).
154. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148
(1951).
155. Zaremski, Expansion of Third Party Recovery: Common law Indemnity, Con-
tribution, or ?, 63 ILL. B.J. 684, 686 (1975).
156. 70 Ill. 2d at 6, 374 N.E.2d at 438.
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the court to distinguish properly between contribution and indemnity
may have led to the theoretical inconsistencies found in many Il-
linois decisions.
The unsatisfactory condition of the Illinois rules regarding con-
tribution and indemnity became even worse when the supreme court
began to extend the principles to new areas in which their applica-
tion seemed inappropriate. In an important decision in 1967, the Il-
linois Supreme Court applied the doctrine of common law indemnity
to a case involving the workers' compensation system. In Miller v.
De Witt'57 employees were injured by the combined negligence of
their employer, the general contractor, and a third party, the ar-
chitect on the construction project. After receiving compensation
the employees brought a third party action against the architect
based on his negligence and violations of the Structural Work Act.
The architect filed a demand for indemnity from the plaintiffs
employer, the general contractor.'58 The supreme court allowed in-
demnification of the architect by the contractor, even though the
contractor argued that the workers' compensation act precluded
such a remedy. 9 The court noted that several previous cases had
allowed indemnification from an actively negligent employer and
that the legislature had taken no action to overrule the decisions.6
Accordingly, the court stated that "the act does not bar a third par-
ty from seeking indemnity from the employer who has paid compen-
sation under the act"'' even when the payment exceeds the
employer's liability under the compensation statute.
The Miller decision had important implications for workers' com-
pensation. The exclusive remedy provision of the compensation act
was not interpreted to limit the employer's liability to the amount of
compensation paid to the employee, despite what seems to be clear
statutory language to the contrary.'2 This successful attack on the
employer's tort immunity was later used by the majority in Skinner
as a basis for arguing that the compensation act did not protect the
employer from liability for contribution.
157. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
158. 37 Ill. 2d at 276, 226 N.E.2d at 633.
159. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (1977) provides, in part: "No common law or
statutory right to recover damages from the employer ...for injury or death ....
other than the compensation herein provided is available to any employee . . ., or any
one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury." ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
(1977) § 138.11 states that "the measure of responsibility of an employer" is to be com-
pensation as provided in the act.
160. 37 Ill. 2d at 290, 226 N.E.2d at 641.
161. Id.
162. See note 159, supra.
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Illinois courts were also asked to decide whether a defendant
strictly liable in tort should be allowed indemnification based upon
the negligence of another. During the years immediately preceding
Skinner, the court was beseiged with requests for indemnity from
manufacturers held liable on the basis of strict liability for defective
products. The leading case in Illinois which established strict liability
for defective products was Suvada v. White Motor Co.' In Suvada
the court held that the party whose liability arose because of a
defective product was entitled to indemnification from the manufac-
turer of a defective part on a strict liability theory.64 The court did
not reach the issue of the manufacturer's right to indemnity from a
subsequent user of the product.
In a line of cases decided between Suvada and Skinner, the Il-
linois appellate courts consistently denied the manufacturers' re-
quests for indemnity. The common basis for the decisions appears to
be the relative impossibility of applying the active-passive negli-
gence test to a defendant held liable on the basis of strict liability.'
Eventually the supreme court heard an appeal from a manufacturer
who had been denied indemnification.' However, the high court's
decision did not settle authoritatively the issue of the
manufacturer's right to indemnity, since the dismissal of the indem-
nification action was upheld on the ground that indemnification was
insufficiently pleaded and that the claim did not state a valid cause
of action.
At approximately the same time that these questions were be-
ing considered by courts throughout Illinois, another significant deci-
sion was rendered by the state supreme court. In Gertz v. Camp-
bell"7 the court held that equitable indemnification, based on the
relative fault of the two negligent tort-feasors (rather than the
active-passive theory of indemnification), was a valid method of
distributing losses. The case is patterned after the important New
York decision of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,"'6 which involved an
employee's third party action based on a manufacturer's negligent
labeling of a poisonous fumigant. The manufacturer requested in-
demnification from the employer, using the passive-active theory of
indemnity. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant-
163. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
164. 32 Ill. 2d at 624, 210 N.E.2d at 188-89.
165. See, e.g., Kossifos v. Louden Mach. Co., 22 Ill. App. 3d 587, 317 N.E.2d 749
(1974); Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 996, 309 N.E.2d 104 (1974).
166. Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516 (1974).
167. 55 Ill. 2d 584, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973).
168. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
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manufacturer and the employer, who was negligent in failing to in-
struct the employee in the proper use of the product, should each be
required to bear a proportion of the loss. Thus, Dole effected two
important changes in New York law. First, the decision replaced the
active-passive negligence theory in indemnification actions with a
system of equitable apportionment based on the relative fault of
those responsible; second, Dole held that the employer is subject to
liability for "partial indemnity" (contribution) to the third party to
the full extent of his responsibility for the loss.' Neither Dole nor
Gertz answers the questions posed in Skinner concerning the strictly
liable manufacturer's right to be indemnified because of the
negligence of another, or concerning the negligent employer's liability
for contribution. Yet, Gertz is important in that it began the prac-
tice in Illinois of apportioning damages according to the relative
fault of each tort-feasor.
This background clarifies the posture of the Skinner case. The
propriety of the supreme court's decision to tackle the convoluted
issues of contribution, indemnity, strict liability, and workers' com-
pensation in one case is likewise more apparent. Nevertheless, the
decision remains a cause for concern. The court's discussion centers
on the desirability of overruling the outdated rule which denied con-
tribution among joint tort-feasors and of substituting a method of
loss-sharing based on the relative fault of those responsible. 7 ' While
this is certainly a worthy topic for the court's consideration, such an
important pronouncement should be made in a case free of ex-
traneous elements such as workers' compensation and strict liability.
Even then the task of judicially instituting an entirely new method
of loss distribution would be complex. The theoretical and practical
difficulties involved in attacking the issue in a case which spans
three different loss reparation systems are staggering.
In Skinner the Illinois Supreme Court intended to establish a
generally applicable rule of loss distribution based on the relative
fault of the wrongdoers and to abolish the common law doctrine de-
nying contribution among joint tort-feasors."7 ' However, the facts
and language of the opinion may have restricted unnecessarily the
court's holding. Under Skinner the manufacturer can recover from
the employer contribution based on the relative fault of each party
only if the request for contribution alleges misuse of the product or
assumption of the risk of the defect on the part of the employer.
Therefore, it seems that only employer fault in terms of misuse or
169. 30 N.Y.2d at 147, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386.




assumption of the risk will suffice to allow contribution, while an ob-
jective standard of negligence does not seem to be sufficient. Thus,
under Miller v. DeWitt 7' an employer's active negligence will entitle
a manufacturer to indemnity in a negligence action, but generally an
employer's negligence will not entitle a manufacturer to indemnity
in a strict liability action.
Perhaps this narrow statement of the holding would not be en-
tirely satisfactory to the majority of the court; but, it is, at least,
more compatible with the basic nature of the workers' compensation
scheme than a rule which subjects the employer to contribution in
all cases in which he is found to be at fault in any degree. The court
in Skinner showed virtually no concern for the no-fault basis of the
compensation system or for the employer's corresponding freedom
from tort liability to his employees. As Justice Dooley's dissenting
opinion correctly pointed out, the employer cannot be termed a tort-
feasor and, therefore, should not be subject to liability for contribu-
tion or indemnity.' Instead, the employer is absolutely liable for
the benefits fixed by the compensation act, while the employee's ac-
tion against the third party is for common law damages. The dif-
ferences in the two forms of recovery should not result in a common
liability.' Justice Dooley further stated that the majority opinion
did not give adequate consideration to the basic compromise struck
when the compensation act was enacted-the employer's assumption
of no-fault responsibility for all work-related accidents in return for
his immunity from common law actions.' Skinner removed the
employer's protection from common law actions, at least in situa-
tions in which he is found to be guilty of assuming the risk of injury
through a defect or of misusing the product. The majority dealt with
the workers' compensation issue in one sentence: "The fact that the
employee's action against the employer is barred by the Workmen's
Compensation Act . . .would not preclude the manufacturer's third
party action against the employer for indemnification [citing Miller
v. DeWitt] and should not serve to bar its action for contribution."'78
The majority's complete reliance on Miller is misplaced. Miller77
subjected the employer to liability for indemnification in negligence
172. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
173. 70 Ill. 2d at 29, 374 N.E.2d at 449 (Dooley, J., dissenting). Justice Dooley relied
on the definition of a joint tort-feasor as stated by Prosser: "The contribution defend-
ant must be a tortfeasor, and originally liable to the plaintiff. If there was never any
such liability .... then he is not liable for contribution." W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at
309.
174. 70 Ill. 2d at 29, 374 N.E.2d at 449 (Dooley, J,, dissenting).
175. 70 Ill. 2d at 34, 374 N.E.2d at 452 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
176. 70 Ill. 2d at 15, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
177. Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
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actions on the active-passive theory of indemnity. It does not
automatically follow that the employer's immunity is similarly
abrogated in contribution claims. As Justice Underwood's dissenting
opinion in Skinner pointed out, indemnity was allowed in Miller to
avoid the unfairness of casting the entire burden of loss on a
passively negligent third party when the employer was actively
responsible for the damage. The fact that the employer in Miller
was more culpable or guilty of greater negligence than the third
party convinced the court to breach the employer's immunity."'8
Because there is no corresponding requirement in Skinner that the
employer's wrongdoing be greater than that of the manufacturer
before contribution is allowed, Justice Underwood felt that the
employer's limited liability had been breached in a manner never
contemplated by Miller.'78
The financial damage done to the workers' compensation system
by decisions such as Miller and Skinner should not be under-
estimated. As pointed out in one dissent to Skinner, workers' com-
pensation benefits are at their highest point ever in Illinois
history. ° In fact, the high cost of compensation insurance has been
credited with driving industry out of the state.' After Skinner the
employer must not only bear the cost of workers' compensation in-
surance; he must also secure insurance coverage for liability based
on product misuse. Accordingly, the manufacturer's responsibility
for the safe condition and operation of his products has been thrust
on the employer. This result seems inconsistent with the policy
justifying the imposition of strict liability on the manufacturers of
defective products in the first place-to place the utlimate liability
for personal injury caused by an unreasonably dangerous product on
the creator of the product and on the supplier, the parties who
reaped the profits from its manufacture."'
Major flaws in the majority's reasoning on strict liability also
may be discovered. While a complete study of the impact of Skinner
on strict liability is beyond the scope of this inquiry, a brief ex-
amination of the strict liability elements of the decision which are
most relevant to the compensation system may be helpful. Most im-
portant is the concern that the policy behind the imposition of strict
liability has been frustrated by the majority opinion.' The manufac-
turer who put the unreasonably dangerous product into the stream
178. 70 Ill. 2d at 20, 374 N.E.2d at 445-46 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. 70 Ill. 2d at 36, 374 N.E.2d at 453 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
183. 70 Ill. 2d at 28, 374 N.E.2d at 449 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
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of commerce is expected to bear the cost of injury to the public as
part of the cost of doing business and as an incentive to the produc-
tion of safer products.' After Skinner at least part of the loss
ultimately will be absorbed by the employer rather than by the
manufacturing enterprise. The temporary imposition of the risk of
loss on the manufacturer, only until it can be transferred to the
employer, doubtless will tend to frustrate the policies behind strict
liability for products. In addition, there are obvious problems involved
in applying a relative fault standard to a manufacturer responsible
on a strict liability theory. The court will lack a common standard of
comparison when the injured employee recovers on the basis of
strict liability, while the manufacturer's request for contribution
alleges negligence on the part of the employer.185 Finally, concern is
expressed that the holding in Skinner has overruled the con-
tributory negligence rule in Illinois in favor of comparative
negligence. 8 " Previously the court had held that any change in the
law of contributory negligence should be left to the legislature.'87
While comparative negligence involves comparison of the fault of all
parties, including the plaintiff, Skinner is concerned only with the
relative fault of the tort-feasors. Nevertheless, the two concepts are
closely related, and as a result of Skinner, Illinois courts are one
step closer to the judicial adoption of comparative negligence.
Practical application of the rules of Skinner and Miller to
employee actions against third parties is relatively simple. The main
complications which may arise in a Skinner-like situation stem from
the difficulty of comparing the relative degrees of fault of a strictly
liable defendant-manufacturer and a negligent employer. However,
these difficulties are present whether or not the indemnification ac-
tion is aimed at an employer. After receiving compensation benefits
from his employer, the injured employee retains the right to pro-
ceed against any third party whose fault was in any manner respon-
sible for his injury. If the employee is successful in his third party
suit, the third party may be entitled to recover some or all of his
loss from the plaintiff's employer, if the employer was also at fault
in causing the employee's injury. At this point the analysis differs,
depending on whether the third party was held liable under
negligence or strict liability principles. If the third party is liable
because of his negligence, Miller v. DeWitt88 supplies the con-
184. 70 Ill. 2d at 34, 374 N.E.2d at 452 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
185. 70 Il. 2d at 18-19, 374 N.E.2d at 445 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
186. 70 Ill. 2d at 19, 374 N.E.2d at 445 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
187. Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
188. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Package Mach. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630
(1967).
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trolling rule and, if the third party succeeds in establishing the ac-
tive negligence of the employer as compared to his own passive
neglect, the third party is entitled to indemnification from the
employer of the entire judgment for the employee. On the other
hand, if the third party is a manufacturer liable on the basis of strict
liability, Skinner'89 determines his right to recover part of the loss
from the employer. In this case the manufacturer is entitled to con-
tribution from the employer only if the employer is negligent for
either assumption of the risk or misuse of the product which con-
tributed to the employee's injuries. It is unlikely that the manufac-
turer proceeding under the Skinner rationale could ever recover the
entire amount of the tort judgment, since his manufacture of the
defective product must have been at least a partial cause of the
employee's injury.
Whether the negligent employer is liable to the third party for
part or all of the employee's tort damages, he retains the right to be
reimbursed the compensation he has paid before the third party
suit.190 The employer's concurring negligence in causing the injury
has not been held to preclude his statutory right to
reimbursement. 9' As in other states, the employer's reimbursement
lien is intended to prevent a double recovery by the employee.'92 To
further this goal, the employer who is held liable to the third party
retains a right to reimbursement. Therefore, the employer actually
pays only the amount for which he is liable to the third party de-
fendant under the doctrines of implied indemnity or equitable con-
tribution. Although the employer has lost his immunity to tort
liability, he is spared the double burden of paying both tort damages
and compensation benefits. Since the negligent employer is entitled
to reimbursement of his compensation payments, he similarly should
be entitled to credit the employee's tort recovery against any re-
maining compensation liability he may have after the third party
suit. However, there are no reported cases on this issue.
CONCLUSION
A survey of compensation law on third party suits reveals that
the issue of the employer's liability for his negligence, at one point
conclusively resolved in favor of the employer, is not dead. The
employer and his insurer continue to argue that the only workable
solution is one which shields them from liability for contribution or
189. 70 Il1. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1978).
190. Galvan v. John Caretti Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 894, 287 N.E.2d 90 (1972); Reeves v.
Tepen, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1004, 268 N.E.2d 912 (1971).
191. Id.




indemnity, at the very least, and ideally would also grant the
employer reimbursement of the compensation paid to the employee,
regardless of the employer's negligence. This position has some
merit but is becoming harder to defend as sympathy for the third
party's plight grows, perhaps as a result of the increased rights
generally afforded joint tort-feasors. Granting the employer reim-
bursement in all cases regardless of his misconduct and, in addition,
shielding him from contribution or indemnity claims asserted
by the third party, has proved to be both unfair to the third party
and unlikely to promote safe working conditions for employees. At
the other extreme, subjecting the employer to tort liability like any
other joint tort-feasor is unjust to the employer, who has assumed
the duty of no-fault compensation in exchange for immunity to
negligence actions. Surprisingly, the Illinois court has adopted that
extreme aproach, subjecting the employer to full tort liability under
certain circumstances, 9 in apparent disregard for the compensation
principle. Considering the nature of the problem, the most satisfac-
tory approach is one which negotiates a compromise between the
employer's right to tort immunity and the third party's right to
share his loss with joint tort-feasors. The North Carolina19' and
California 9 ' decisions on this subject are admirable attempts to ef-
fect such a solution. A perfect plan which would accommodate fully
the rights of both the employer and the third party is impossible,
but a least the lawyers, judges, and legislators in North Carolina,
California, and Illinois are rethinking the problem and working
toward a more satisfactory resolution of what Professor Arthur Lar-
son has characterized as "[p]erhaps the most evenly-balanced con-
troversy in all of workmen's compensation law .... ..
Although Louisiana's rules regarding the rights and obligations
of an employer whose negligence combines with that of a third party
to injure an employee have not been discussed here, many of the
criticisms of other states' systems, past and present, may be equally
applicable to the Louisiana system. Perhaps Louisiana lawmakers
will consider innovative approaches instituted in other jurisdictions
when the question of the ramifications of the employer's negligence
arises again, as it must, in this state.197
193. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437
(1978).
194. Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950); Brown v.
Southern Ry. Co., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E. 419 (1933).
195. Associated Constr. & Eng'r Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22
Cal. 3d 829, 587 P.2d 684, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1978).
196. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Third Party's Action Over Against
Employer, 65 Nw. U. L. REV. 351, 351 (1970).
197. See W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 14, at §§ 370-71 in 14 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE at 183-206.
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